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On 15 June 2011, the day on which I read Randolph Roth’s reply to my critical
review, the Volkskrant published an item about an exhibition in a Leiden museum
occasioned by the fact that in the Netherlands very few of the nineteen Dutchmen
who had received the Nobel prize had a street named after them1. It is surely to
Roth’s credit that he leads my thoughts into unexpected directions from where they
would have stayed away without his book. The heading in the Volkskrant simply
states: « the Dutch don’t care about the Nobel prize», but could there be a link
between this lack of street names and Dutch homicide rates? If we assume a delay
of some ten years between receiving the prize and an occasion for the naming of a
street or square after the laureate, quite a number of the implicit omissions occurred
in the 1920s and 1930s, when Dutch homicide rates were exceptionally low. But
then again, perhaps Nobel laureates do not count as national heroes.
Roth calls my defense of Norbert Elias’ theory of civilizing processes (deprecia -
tingly referred to as « the civilization thesis») aggressive. Maybe that is a pun on the
subject under discussion. In line with this perception, however, he constantly attri -
butes «claims» and «objections» to me and even has me see «grave threats». To
the contrary, I am quite willing to accept all the evidence of American Homicide – if
my doubts are addressed – and assess its meaning for the theory of civilizing
processes. Indeed, I am grateful to Roth for his attempt, at the end of his reply, to
make a beginning with such an assessment. I had merely put a few questions, occa-
sioned by the fact that some vital information was so hard to find in his book and
even on his website. His reply does not satisfactorily answer all my questions.
Let me first clarify a number of misunderstandings (at the risk of being super-
fluous, because many readers of our exchange will already have concluded this). I
present my points more or less in the order in which these misunderstandings mani-
fest themselves in Roth’s reply. (1) I did not call the thesis of American Homicide an
extension of LaFree’s thesis. I used the word parallel and concluded that it reads like
an extension. In my review I quoted the full passage that Roth repeats in his reply. I
had read on Roth’s website that he had developed his ideas independently from
LaFree and I do not particularly care about this issue. (2) I do not prefer only « total
homicide rates.» In fact, I have amply analyzed, quantitatively and even more so
qualitatively, various types of homicide in my History of Murder (2008). I fail to
see why we can’t do both: present total figures and figures per type of homicide.
1 There were no female Dutch Nobel Laureates. It should be noted that the delay between my review
and Randy’s reply was not at all his fault. It resulted from the fact that this Forum issue had originally
been planned as an exchange between more than two scholars.
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Moreover, for many periods and places it is impossible or difficult to distinguish
between types of murders. We do know that, whenever and wherever homicide rates
are very high, male-on-male fighting largely accounts for this.
(3) Roth says that I question his «decision to include political homicides and law
enforcement homicides» in his study. I have said nothing about political homicides.
By law enforcement homicides he presumably means killings by police: as already
explained, these are acts of state violence, hence not homicides. (4) I am puzzled
why Roth should think that I object to the capture-recapture method, which I called
refined. I merely said that this method cannot be applied for much of European his-
tory. Dutch newspapers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example,
report about such matters as incoming ships, but almost never about murder. (5) In
connection with this, Roth states that I consider the distinction between legal and
non-legal sources arbitrary. I had merely asked him to indicate exactly, within the
legal category, for which times and places this category included coroner’s records
and for which periods and places indictments only – a piece of information that was
very hard to find. If I understand his reply correctly, I have to look this up on his
website for each case separately. That is an unreasonable demand from even the
interested reader.
The last misunderstanding (6) concerns, not so much my review, but Elias’
 theory as a whole. Roth refers to this theory in terms of causes and consequences,
whereas Elias maintains that in order to explain historical transformations we need
to clarify the structure of processual change. Historical transformations are made up
of interdependent long-term processes that mutually affect each other. Processes of
state formation and nation building, for example, are usually interrelated, whereas
Roth wants to rigorously separate them.
Next, I want to briefly identify the remaining problems or the questions that, in
my view, have not been satisfactorily answered. These are the following:
1. Colonial rates. Are there years during the colonial era for which the legal records
consist of indictments only, combined with the non-availability of newspapers
(so that application of the capture-recapture method is impossible)? If so, which
years and for which regions? This is simply a piece of information that should
have been provided in the book. I maintain that homicide rates based on prose-
cution records alone are worthless. In sixteenth-century Amsterdam, for exam-
ple, the ratio of detected to prosecuted killings was 9:12.
2. Colonial violence. Even if all rates presented by Roth are reliable, the remarks in
my review are pertinent : can we consider the colonies as nonviolent societies?
3. The so-called age-specific homicide rates. What prevents him from first pre-
senting total homicide rates and then examining contributing factors such as the
proportion of children in a population, if known? That procedure contributes to
historical comparability. Moreover, in which category do we place cases in
which an adult kills an unrelated youth? Is this not an indication for the level of
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aggression among adults? The criterion of population at risk is only one among
others. The homicide rate also tells us something about how familiar, or not
familiar, people of all ages were with murder in their community. Finally, the
cate gory of homicide among unrelated adults is far from homogeneous. It
includes both the conventional bar room brawl and the liquidation of a competi-
tor in organized crime.
4. The obligation to disaggregate. I noted that, due to the great regional and tempo-
ral variations in the feelings of communalism that are supposed to determine the
homicide level, Roth’s theory obliges him constantly to disaggregate. That
seems to me a problem inherent in the theory.
5. Small populations. That the size of the population should not be too small has
already been posited by Lawrence Stone and this continues to be a sound princi-
ple, despite Roth’s sophisticated mathematics3. I do consider Robert Dykstra too
radical in this. In the small Swedish town of Arboga, for example, the fluctua-
tions of the homicide rate per decade are meaningless, but the average rate of 23
between 1452 and 1543 is meaningful4. However, when homicide rates in small
counties are expected each time to reflect phases of conflict or solidarity extend-
ing over just a few years, this expectation prohibits us from averaging them over
a longer period.
6. The role of honor. Honor is obviously related to status, culture and much more.
The idea that traditional male honor based on bravery and violence migrated
from antebellum Southern whites to postbellum Southern blacks and with them
to the inner cities of the North is widespread in historiography. It was first put
forward by Edward Ayers and popularized by authors such as Fox Butterfield5.
My modest contribution was to connect the honor-violence syndrome to the
American path of state formation. Roth believes that he can identify some
killings as killings over honor while others are not. By contrast, most historians
of early modern Europe point out that this is a fallacy and that honor is involved
in nearly all cases of male-on-male violence, for example conflicts over property
rights6.
Let me finish on a theoretical note. Obviously there is a distinction between
examining long-term developments and short-term or middle-term fluctuations.
Whereas Elias’ theory is primarily concerned with the former, Roth’s thesis appears
more attuned to the latter. We already knew that the long-term development on the
North-American continent was a bit fuzzy compared to that in Europe. With respect
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to the European long-term development, in the words of Manuel Eisner, « the evi-
dence is so consistent, the secular decline so regular and the differences in levels so
large, that it seems difficult to refute the conclusion of a real and notable decline»7.
What about fluctuations? For America perhaps Roth’s thesis holds; the observations
by a number of cultural historians whom he cites point in that direction. For Europe,
I am less convinced. That homicide rates soared for brief spans of time in revolu-
tionary situations and during and immediately after the world wars is well-known
and in line with Elias’ theory. I will have to leave the re-examination of other
instances mentioned by Roth for a later time. They are all from his book, save for the
case of Corsica. Roger Gould’s book came to my attention only recently through an
article by Anton Blok8 and it too deserves a more thorough treatment9.
One of the most conspicuous short-term fluctuations in European history con-
cerns the Amsterdam peak in homicides (rising to nearly 10 per 100,000) from the
early 1690s to the mid-1720s, which largely coincided with the heyday of knife
fighting. I am still at a loss how to explain it, but in this case, unfortunately, Roth’s
thesis is not a good candidate. The most divisive factor in Dutch society at the time
had to do with the House of Orange. Much of the Prince’s support came from the
lower orders, while his major opponents were from Holland’s patriciate. The homi-
cide peak extended over the last ten years of William III’s rule (historians state that,
he was king of The Netherlands and Stadholder of England, if not in name, then in
reality) and the first half of the second stadholderless age. Actual strife occurred
mainly during the transition, in 1702-1703.
So, yes, I think that the debate will continue, at conferences and in other period-
icals. And I hope for a fruitful research climate in the future, so that it can be done
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